Experimental Study of Associative Processes 145 
em. The really effective part of animal consciousness, 
en, as of human, is the part which is attended to; at- 
tention is the ruler of animal as well as human mind. 
But in giving attention its deserts we need not forget 
that it is not here comparable to the whole of human at- 
tention. Our attention to the other player and the ball 
in a game of tennis 7s like the animal’s attention, but our 
attention to a passage in Hegel, or the memory which 
flits through our mind, or the song we hear, or the player 
we idly watch, is not. There ought, I think, to be a separate 
name for attention when working for immediate practical 
associations. It is a different species from that which 
holds objects so that we may define them, think about them, 
remember them, etc., and the difference is, as our previous 
sentence shows, not that between voluntary and involun- 
‘tary attention. The cat watching me for signs of my walk- 
ing to the cage with fish is not in the condition of the man 
watching a ball game, but in that of the player watching 
the ball speeding toward him. There is a notable difference 
in the permanence of the impression. The man watching 
the game can remember just how that fly was hit and how 
the fielder ran for it, though he bestowed only a slight 
quantity of attention on the matter, while the fielder may 
attend to the utmost to the ball and yet not remember at 
all how it came or how he ran for it. The\one sort of atten- 
tion leads you to think about a thing, the other to act with 
reference to it., We must be careful to remember that 
when we say that the cat attended to what was said, we 
do not mean that he thereby established an idea of it. 
Animals are not proved to form separate ideas of sense-, 
impressions because they attend to them, for the kind of 
attention they give is the kind which, when given by men, | 
results in practical associations, not in establishing ideas’ 
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