146 Animal Intelligence 
of objects. If attention rendered clear the idea, we should 
not have the phenomena of incomplete forgetfulness lately 
mentioned. The animal would get a definite idea of just 
the exact thing done and would do it or nothing. The 
human development of attention is in closest connection 
with the acquisition of a stock of free ideas. 
SocriaL CONSCIOUSNESS 
Besides attention there is another topic somewhat apart 
from our general one, which yet deserves a few words. It 
concerns animals’ social consciousness, their consciousness 
of the feelings of their fellows. Do animals, for example, 
when they see others feeding, feel that the others are feeling 
pleasure? Do they, when they fight, feel that the other 
feels pain? So level-headed a thinker as Lloyd Morgan has 
said that they do, but the conduct of my animals would 
seem to show that they did not. For it has given us good 
reason to suppose that they do not possess amy stock of iso- 
lated ideas, much less any abstracted, inferred, or transferred 
ideas. These ideas of others’ feelings imply a power to trans- 
fer states felt in oneself to another and realize them as there. 
“Now it seems that any ability to thus transfer and realize 
an idea ought to carry with it an ability to form a trans- 
ferred association, toimitate. If the animal realizes the men- 
tal states of the other animal who before his eyes pulls the 
string, goes out through the door, and eats fish, he ought to 
form the association, ‘impulse to pull string, pleasure of 
eating fish.’ This we saw the animal could not do. 
In fact, pleasure in another, pain in another, is not a 
sense-presentation or a representation or feeling of an ob- 
ject of any sort, but rather a ‘meaning,’ a feeling ‘of the 
fact that. It can exist only as something thought about. 
