Experimental Study of Associative Processes 149 
To the interactionist I would say: “Do not any more 
repeat in tiresome fashion that consciousness does alter 
movement, but get to work and show when, where, in what 
forms and to what degrees it does so. Then, even if it turns 
out to have been a physical parallel that did the work, you 
will, at least, have the credit of attaining the best knowledge 
about the results and their conditions, even though you mis- 
named the factor.” 
Besides this contribution to general psychology, I think 
we may safely offer one to pedagogical science. At least 
some of our results possess considerable pedagogical inter- 
est. The fundamental form of intellection, the association-~ ; 
process in animals, is one, we decided, which requires the 
personal experience of the animal in all its elements. The 
association cannot be taught by putting the animal through 
it or giving it a chance to imitate. Now every observant ' 
teacher realizes how often the cleverest explanation and the 
best models for imitation fail. Yet often, in such cases, a 
pupil, if somehow enticed to do the thing, even without 
comprehension of what it means, even without any real 
knowledge of what he is doing, will finally get hold of it. 
So, also, in very many kinds of knowledge, the pupil who ~~ | 
does anything from imitation, or who does anything from 
being put through it, fails to get a real and permanent mas- 
tery of the thing. I am sure that with a certain type of 
mind the only way to teach fractions in algebra, for example, 
is to get the pupil to do, do, do. Iam inclined to think that 
in many individuals certain things cannot be learned save by 
actual performance. And I think it is often a fair question, 
when explanation, imitation and actual performance are all 
possible methods, which is the best. We are here alongside 
the foundations of mental life, and this hitherto unsuspected 
law of animal mind may prevail in human mind to an extent 
