Laws and Hypotheses for Behavior 273 
into the mind in various ways and had power to arouse 
certain acts and other ideas more or less mysteriously, in the 
manner described by the laws of ideo-motor action, atten- 
tion, association by contiguity, association by similarity, 
suggestion, imitation, dynamo-genesis and the like, with 
possibly a surplus of acts and ideas due to ‘free will.’ | The 
mind was treated as a crucible in which a multifarious so- 
lution of ideas, impulses and automatisms boiled away, 
giving off, as a consequence of a subtle chemistry, an 
abundance of thoughts and movements. |‘ Human behavior 
was rarely viewed from without as a series of jolt, asa 
bound in various ways to a series of situations.| | 'The stu- 
dent of animal behavior passed as quickly as might be from 
such mere externals to the inner life of the creature, making 
it his chief interest to decide whether it had percepts, 
memories, concepts, abstractions, ideas of right and wrong, 
choices, a self, a conscience, a sense of beauty. The facts 
in intellect and character that are due to learning, that are 
not the inherited property of the species and that conse- 
quently are beyond the scope of evolution in the race, 
were not separated off from the facts of original nature. 
The comparative psychologist misspent his energy on such 
problems as the phylogenesis of the idea of self, moral 
judgments, or the sentiment of filial affection. 
At the other extreme, the behavior of the protozoa was 
either contemplated in the light of futile analogies, — for 
instance, between discriminative reactions and conscious 
choice, and between inherited instincts and memory, — or 
studied crudely in its results without observation of what 
the animals really did. The protozoa were regarded either 
as potential ‘conscious selves’ or as drifting lumps turned 
hither and thither by the direct effects of light, heat, gravity 
and chemical forces upon their tissues. 
T 
