The Evolution of Human Intellect 289 
that learned to get out of a box by pulling a loop of wire 
did not feel the parts of the box separately, the bolt as a 
definite circle of a certain size, did not feel his act as a sum 
of certain particular movements. | The monkey who learned 
to know the letter K from the letter Y did not feel the sepa- 
rate lines of the letter, have definite ideas of the parts. 
He just felt one way when he saw one total impression and 
another way when he saw another. \ 
Strictly human thinking, on the contrary, has as its essen- 
tial characteristic the breaking up of gross total situations 
into feelings of particular facts. When in the presence 
of ten jumping tigers we not only feel like running, but also 
feel the number of tigers, their color, their size, etc. When, 
instead of merely associating some act with some situation 
in the animal way, we think the situation out, we have a 
set of particular feelings of its elements. In some cases, it 
is true, we remain restricted to the animal sort of feelings. 
The sense impressions of suffocation, of the feeling of a 
‘new style of clothes, of the pressure of 10 feet of water above 
us, of malaise, of nausea/and such like remain for most of us 
vague total feelings to which we react and which we feel 
most acutely but which do not take the form of definite 
ideas that we can isolate or combine or compare, { Such 
feelings we say are not parts of our real intellectual life. — 
They are parts of our intellectual life if we mean by it the 
mental life concerned in learning, but they are not if we 
mean by it the life of reasoning.. 
(Can we now see how the vague gross feelings of the animal 
sort might turn into the well-defined particular ideas of the 
human sort, by the aid of a multitude of delicate associations? _ 
It seems to be a general law of mind that any mental 
element which occurs with a number of different mental 
elements, appears, that is, in a number of different com- 
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