i 
AS APPLIED TO MAN, 361. 
its proper treatment. No physiologist or philosopher 
has yet ventured to propound an intelligible theory, of 
how sensation may possibly be a product of organiza- 
tion ; while many have declared the passage from mat- 
ter to mind to be inconceivable. In his presidential 
address to the Physical Section of the British Associa- 
tion at Norwich, in 1868, Professor Tyndall expressed 
himself as follows :— 
‘The passage from the physics of the brain to the 
corresponding facts of consciousness is unthinkable. 
Granted that a definite thought, and a definite mole- 
cular action in the brain occur simultaneously, we do 
not possess the intellectual organ, nor apparently any 
rudiment of the organ, which would enable us to pass 
by a process of reasoning from the one phenomenon 
to the other. They appear together, but we do not 
know why. Were our minds and senses so expanded, 
strengthened, and illuminated as to enable us to see and 
feel the very molecules of the brain; were we capable 
of following all their motions, all their groupings, all 
their electric discharges, if such there be, and were we 
intimately acquainted with the corresponding states of 
thought and feeling, we should be as far as ever from 
-the solution of the problem, ‘ How are these physical 
processes connected with the facts of consciousness ?’ 
The chasm between the two classes of phenomena would 
still remain intellectually impassable.” 
In his latest work (“‘An Introduction to the Classifica- 
tion of Animals,’””) published in 1869, Professor Huxley 
unhesitatingly adopts the “well founded doctrine, that 
