where it stood." In it we possess an acquisition of our 

 century which rests on facts, and which undoubtedly ranks 

 amongst its greatest." 



This last sentence affirms exactly what I have repeat- 

 edly asserted: the doctrine of Descent remains, Darwinism 

 passes away. Hertwig then is decidedly of opinion that 

 Darwinism entirely fails in the individual case because in 

 its application the basis of experience vanishes. Indeed, 

 according to him, phylogeny is not at all capable of direct 

 scientific investigation. These are all important admis- 

 sions which one would certainly have considered impos- 

 sible twenty years ago; they unequivocally indicate the de- 

 cline of Darwinian views, and in a certain way also har- 

 monize with Fleischmann's work. 



True, Hertwig still clings to the thought of Descent, 

 but apparently no longer as to a conclusion of natural 

 science. This appears from the assertion: ''Ontogeny 

 alone is capable of a direct scientific (he evidently 

 speaks of natural science) investigation," and from the 

 other statement that a philosophically trained investigator 

 will accept it (Descent) as axiomatic although it belongs to 

 the domain of hypothesis. What else does this mean but 

 that: We have no specific knowledge of Descent but we 

 believe in it. In short, this is not natural science but nat- 

 ural philosophy; it forms no constituent part of our certain 

 knowledge of nature but it is one aspect of our world- 

 view. 



All the above-quoted assertions of Hertwig are calm 



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