20 The Animal Mind 



it" (233, p. 7). The psychic and the physical, on this 

 theory, should be coextensive; not merely should con- 

 sciousness in some form belong to all living things, but 

 every atom of matter should have its psychic aspect. 

 On such a basis, Forel takes highly optimistic views of 

 the animal mind. In insects, of which he has made a 

 special study, it is, he thinks, "possible to demonstrate 

 the existence of memory, associations of sensory images, 

 perceptions, attention, habits, simple powers of inference 

 from analogy, the utilization of individual experience, and 

 hence distinct, though feeble, plastic individual delibera- 

 tions or adaptations" (233, p. 36). 



A pecuHar position on the problem of mind in animals 

 is occupied by the "vitalists," of whom Driesch (191) 

 is the foremost representative. They regard the reactions 

 of organisms as requiring the operation of psychic forces 

 or "entdechies" ; they hold that as physical phenomena 

 such reactions cannot be explained save through the work- 

 ing of these psychic forces. A living being is forever dis- 

 tinguished from a Hfeless creature by the presence of such 

 entelechies. Thus the vitalist is an interactionist and a 

 duahst : the worlds of the lifeless and the Hving are to him 

 forever distinct. 



The opposite camp is represented by Bethe, Beer, von 

 Uexkiill, Loeb, and other physiologists, as well as by 

 Watson. 



The eminent neurologist Bethe, in his study of the be- 

 havior of ants and bees, refuses to allow these animals any 

 "psychic qualities" whatever, and suggests the term 

 "chemo-reception" instead of "smell," to designate the 

 influence which directs most of their reactions, — "smell" 

 impljdng a psychic quality (51). In a footnote to a later 

 article he says : "Psychic qualities cannot be demonstrated. 



