22 The Animal Mind 



responses to stimulation where no nervous system exists, 

 the term antitypes;,_ for those involving a nervous system, 



antikineses I the latter are divided into reflexes, where 



flie, response is uniform, and antiklises, jsihsi^ the response 

 is modifiable. A sense-organ becomes a reception-organ, 

 sensory nerves are receptory-nerves, and we have phono- 

 reception, stibo-reception, photo-reception, instead of hear- 

 ing, smell, and sight. The after-effect of a stimulus upon 

 later ones is the resonance of the stimulus (39). 



Loeb (434) agrees with Bethe that physico-chemical pro- 

 cesses and not states of consciousness are the proper objects 

 of investigation for the "psychologist." These men evi- 

 dently regard the universe as essentially uniform through- 

 out — there exists for them no gulf between living and life- 

 less things ; the behavior of living beings will be reduced 

 to a series of chemical reactions as soon as science has pro- 

 gressed sufficiently far. They are "mechanists." It is, 

 however, perfectly possible to be a mechanist so far as 

 the explanation of animal behavior is concerned, and still 

 admit that animals have consciousness and that their 

 behavior is accompanied by inner, mental states which 

 it is the business of the psychologist to investigate. One 

 does not have to be a vitalist to beUeve that animals have 

 minds: one may hold that every action of an animal 

 will some day be explained as the result of physico-chemical 

 processes, and yet maintain that the actions x)f animals 

 are conscious. The consciousness would be an accompanir^ 

 ment, an inner aspect, of the physico-chemical processes. 



The views of Loeb and Bethe have gained much ground 

 lately among certain American psychologists, notably 

 Watson (771). The position of these "behaviorists" 

 seems not to have been fully thought out in its philosophical 

 aspects, but is somewhat as follows. The diflSculties of 



