Difficulties and Methods 23 



interpreting an animal's mind from its behavior are so 

 great that such inferences have no scientific value. We 

 may therefore proceed as if animals had no minds; or 

 rather, as if mind were a kind of behavior, observable 

 by outside means. Since it is obvious that the difficulty 

 of interpreting an animal's mind from its behavior is only 

 greater in degree than, not unlik^ in kind, the difficulty 

 of interpreting other humaii minds from behavior, human 

 psychology also should confine itself to the observation 

 merely of the actions of other persons, and permit no infer- 

 ences as to the inner aspect of such actions. In fact, 

 there is no inner aspect to such actions — thoughts and 

 feelings, human as weU as animal, are only behavior, and 

 if we have at present no instruments for inspecting and 

 measuring the movements which are thoughts and feelings, 

 such instruments will in time be discovered. 



In opposition to these views, we shaU in this book main- 

 tain the following position. There exists an inner asp ect 

 to beh avior, the r ealm of sensations. feelin £S^aji4 tiiougbts. 

 which is not its elf identical with behavio x-Or-with any form 

 of movem ent. Thoughts probably always have as their 

 accompaniment bodily movements, but the thought is not 

 identical mth the movement. If a physiologist perfected 

 an instrument by which he could observe the nervous 

 process in my cortex that occurs when I am conscious 

 of the sensation red, he would see nothing red about it; 

 if he could watch the bodily movements that result from 

 this stimulation, say, for instance, the slight contraction of 

 the articulatory muscles that occurs when I say "red" to 

 myself, he would not see them as red. The red is in my 

 consciousness, and no devices for observing and register- 

 ing my movements will ever observe the red, though they 

 may easily lead to the inference that it exists in my con- 



