] 



28 The'lAnimal Mind 



not a mere rebound; it implies energy contributed by 

 the animal's own body. But just so an explosion of gun- 

 powder is not the equivalent in energy, of the heat of the 

 match, the stimulus. Similarly it is possible to think of 

 the response made by animals to external stimuli as in- 

 volving nothing more than certain physical and chemical 

 processes identical with those existing in inanimate nature. 



If we find that the movements made by an animal as a 

 / result of external stimulation regularly involve withdrawal 

 I from certain stimuU and acceptance of others, it is natural 

 V to use the term "choice" in describing such behavior. But 

 if consciousness is supposed to accompany the exercise of 

 choice in this sense, then consciousness must be assumed 

 to accompany the behavior of atoms in chemical combina- 

 tions. When hydrochloric acid is added to a solution of 

 silver nitrate, the atoms of chlorine and those of silver find 

 each other by an unerring "instinct" and combine into the 

 white precipitate of silver chloride, while the hydrogen 

 and the nitric acid similarly " choose " each other. Nor 

 can the fact that behavior in animals is adapted to an end be 

 used as evidence of mind ; for "purposive" reactions, which 

 contribute to the welfare of an organism, are themselves 

 selective. The search for food, the care for the young, 

 and the complex activities which further welfare, are made 

 up of reactions involving "choice" between stimuli; and 

 if the simple "choice" reaction is on a par with the behavior 

 of chemical atoms, so far as proof of consciousness goes, 

 then adaptation to an end, apparent purposiveness, is in a 

 similar position. 



Thus the mere fact that an animal reacts to stimulation, 

 even selectively and for its own best interests, offers no evi- 

 dence for the existence of mind that does not apply equally 

 well to particles of inanimate matter. Moreover, there is 



