32 The Animal Mind 



that when defined, it is inadequate to bear the whole weight 

 of proving consciousness in animals. Such being the case, 

 the possibility that animals which have not been shown 

 to learn may yet be conscious acquires the right to be 

 reckoned with. 



/ The first point that strikes us in examining the proposed 

 . /test is that the learning by experience must not be too slow, 

 or we can find parallels for it in the inanimate world. An 

 animal may be said to have learned by experience if it be- 

 haves differently to a stimulus because of preceding stimuli. 

 But it is one thing to have behavior altered by a single pre- 

 ceding stimulus, and another to have it altered by two hun- 

 dred repetitions of a stimulus. The wood of a violin reacts 

 differently to the vibrations of the strings after it has "expe- 

 rienced " them for ten years ; the molecules of the wood have 

 gradually taken on an altered arrangement. A steel rail re- 

 acts differently to the pounding of wheels after that process 

 has been long continued; it may snap under the strain. 

 Shall we say that the violin and the rail have learned by 

 / individual experience ? If the obvious retort be made that 

 I / it is only in living creatures that learning by experience 

 should be taken as evidence of mind, let us_ take an exam- 

 ple from living creatures. When a blacksmith has been 

 practising his trade for a year, the reactions of his muscles 

 are different from what they were at the outset. But this 

 difference is not merely a matter of more accurate sense- 

 discrimination, a better "placing" of attention and the 

 like ; there have been going on within the structure of his 

 muscles changes which have increased their efficiency, 

 and with which consciousness has had nothing to do. 

 These changes have been extremely slow compared to the 

 learning which does involve consciousness. In one or two 

 lessons the apprentice learned what he was to do ; but only 



