36 The Animal Mind 



2. Nervous system (Neural organization). 



3. Specialization in the nervous system (Neural 



specialization). 

 II. Functional Criteria. 



1. General form of reaction (Discrimination). 



2. Modifiability of reaction (Docility). 



3. Variability of reaction (Initiative)" (814). 



The terms "discrimination," "docihty," and "initiative" 

 in this connection are borrowed from Royce's "Outlines of 

 Psychology" (649). 



If resemblance of nervous and sense-organ structure to the 

 human type is to be taken along with rapid learning as co- 

 ordinate evidence of consciousness, it is clear that here also 

 we have to deal with a matter of degree. The structure of 

 the lower animals differs increasingly from our own as we go 

 down the scale. At what degree of difiference shall we draw 

 the line and say that the animals above it may be conscious, 

 but that those below it cannot be ? No one could possibly 

 establish such a line. The truth of the whole matter seems 

 to be this : We can say neither what amount of resemblance in 

 structure to human beings, nor what speed of learning, consti- 

 tutes a definite mark distinguishing animals with minds from 

 those without minds, unless we are prepared to assert that 

 only animals which learn so fast that they must have memory 

 ideas possess mind at all. And this would conflict with 

 the argument from structure. [For example, there is no 

 good experimental evidence that cats possess ideas, yet 

 there is enough analogy between their nervous systems 

 and our own to make it improbable that consciousness, 

 so complex and highly developed in us, is in them wholly 

 lacking. J We know not where consciousness begins in 

 the animal world. We know where it surely resides — 

 in ourselves; we know where it exists beyond a reason- 



