296 The Animal Mind 



box; this was heightened by the blue, and finally "dis- 

 charged" into action by the red. During this process 

 they may have had an anticipatory image of the blue and 

 of the red, although there is no evidence that they did. 

 But when the red came they did not stop to call up memory 

 images of the preceding colors, and decline to act until 

 they had assured themselves that those were blue and 

 white instead of red. Preparedness to act was probably 

 already secured by the actual occurrence of the white card 

 at the beginning of the series. In other words, while 

 images may have been present, they were images with a 

 future, not a past reference. A human being reacting to a 

 series of stimuli in this fashion would but rarely, in case 

 his attention had wandered during the giving of the first 

 two stimuH, have to recall them as memory images be- 

 fore reaction, but he might very likely have anticipatory 

 images of the stimuli to come while waiting for them. 

 These criticisms, which appeared in the first edition of 

 the present work, were later repeated by Gregg and Mc- 

 Pheeters (268 a), who made experiments similar to Cole's. 

 In favor of the functioning of ideas in monkeys and 

 raccoons is the fact that in learning to open puzzle-boxes, 

 they drop off useless movements with great speed. And 

 monkeys have given clear evidence of inferential imitation. 

 Kinnaman (401) reports that in one of his experiments, 

 where the box had to be opened by pulling out a plug, a 

 monkey failed to work the mechanism and gave up in 

 despair. Another monkey then came out of the cage, the 

 first one following. Number two went to the box, seized 

 the end of the plug with his teeth, and pulled it out. The 

 box was set again, and monkey number one rushed to it, 

 seized the plug as number two had done, and got the food. 

 She immediately repeated the act eight times. A second 



