TEE ORIGIN OF MAN 245 



He says: " We have now seen that actions are re- 

 garded by savages, and were probably so regarded by 

 primeval man, as good or bad, solely as they affect in 

 an obvious manner the welfare of the tribe." * 



From this I presume he means that the most useful 

 experiences have formed the most persistent instincts, 

 so that there is no substantial difference between his 

 and Spencer's theory. Both seek to trace the origin 

 of the moral faculty to useful experiences. 



Darwin says: "The moral sense perhaps affords 

 the best and highest distinction between man and the 

 lower animals." t 



He thus defines a moral being: "A moral being is 

 one who is capable of comparing his past and future 

 actions or motives, and of approving or disapproving 

 of them. We have no reason to suppose that any of 

 the lower animals have this capacity; therefore when 

 a monkey faces danger to rescue its comrade, or takes 

 charge of an orphan monkey, we do not call its con- 

 duct moral." J 



Here we have the admission that no animal is a 

 moral being. Again he says that " man alone can 

 with certainty be ranked as a moral being." § 



From these quotations we see the method by which 

 Darwin and Spencer attempt to account for the origin 

 of the moral nature of man. The great gulf between 

 man and brute is admitted, but it is claimed that a 

 protracted education, supplemented by inheritance to 

 preserve what is gained, will convert animal into man. 

 It is easy to imagine that by infinitely small steps any 

 two points, however distant from each other, may be 

 traversed — that by infinitesimal changes any change, 

 however great, maybe made, but the practical difficul- 

 ty of applying this theory is that the gulfs on the 



* Descent of Man, Vol. 1, p. 101. 

 t Ibid, p. 85. \ Ibid § Ibid. 



