THE ORIGIN OF MAN 247 



ferent in quality from other powers, then it could 

 not have been evolved from those powers. 



Spencer seeks to account for the origin of the 

 moral faculty by " experiences of utility," but it is 

 evident that experience can only educate and improve 

 a faculty that exists, and not form a new one that is 

 different in kind. Educating the special senses can- 

 not create a mental power, nor can experiences of 

 memory create the power to reason, nor do we know 

 that any one faculty can create another, although the 

 various powers may be of mutual benefit to each 

 other. 



The question is not, how can a faculty be improved? 

 but, how can it be created? 



If evolutionists can prove the identity of all psychic 

 phenomena, then their theory may be true. If, on 

 the other hand, these are so distinct in kind that one 

 cannot be changed into another, then the theory fails. 

 Spencer's " experiences of utility," accumulated 

 and inherited for many generations, explains, if true, 

 at most, the improvement of existing faculties, and 

 not the creation of new ones. 



Take, for example, the special senses. Would it be 

 possible by using the eye to evolve an ear? Or could 

 taste or smell or any other sense give birth to sight? 

 It is easy to talk about accumulating experiences 

 through many generations, in the nervous system, and 

 thus evolving all senses and all mental powers, but 

 experiences can be such only in relation to faculties 

 that exist. 



Again, could the diligent use of memory — a faculty 

 necessary to all high mental operations — produce the 

 power of abstract reasoning, or conscience, or the 

 knowledge of right and wrong? However necessary 

 memory may be to the reasoning faculty, yet how 

 widely different they are in kind ! The latter faculty 



