THE ORIGIN OF MAN 249 



unlikenesses are small compared with those which 

 distinguish members of the one group from members 

 of the other." * 



He also claims, "that the multitudinous forms of 

 Mind known as different feelings, may be composed 

 of simpler units of feeling, and even of units funda- 

 mentally of one kind." t 



From the above it is seen that Spencer admits that 

 there are " multitudinous " and " extremely strong " 

 " unlikenesses " between mental phenomena, but he 

 attempts to explain away the differences by assuming 

 that each feeling is composed of simple units of feel- 

 ing fundamentally of one kind. 



As a supposed analogy for this argument he refers 

 to the fact that most substances in nature are com- 

 pounds made up of a few simple substances, and that 

 different compounds may be used by grouping the 

 atoms differently and by taking different relevant 

 numbers of the same atoms. 



It is evident, I think, that the supposed analogy 

 will not hold good unless we assume Hatter and Mind 

 to be fundamentally alike, a proposition which Mr. 

 Spencer himself would not affirm. 



We see in the above the usual method which the 

 evolutionist adopts in deriving the most diverse 

 things, one from the other — namely, the addition or 

 subtraction of atom by atom till the change is 

 wrought. This subtle way of proceeding always 

 leaves one in doubt as to just which atom he ought to 

 strike out from the imaginary chain of evolution. 



To simplify the subject he makes use of the suppo- 

 sition which has been made by others, that there is 

 "but one ultimate form of Matter," — so there may be 

 "units of feeling " " fundamentally of one kind." 



* Principles of Psychology, Vol. 1, p. 163. t Ibid, p. 156. 



