146 THE WHENCE AND THE WHITHER OF MAN 



the jackal, the dog's nearest relatives, if not his actual 

 ancestors, are not especially intelligent mammals. 

 Compared with them the dog is a sage and a saint. 



The earliest form of action is the reflex. This is 

 independent of both consciousness and will. The 

 only conscious voluntary action of the animal is limited 

 mainly or entirely to the recognition and attainment of 

 food. The motive for the exertion of the will is the 

 appetite, and the will is the slave or mouthpiece of 

 the body. Far higher than this is the stage of in- 

 stinct. Here the animal is conscious of its actions 

 and new motives begin to appear. But the animal is 

 guided by tendencies inherited from its ancestors. The 

 will has, so to speak, advisory power ; it is by no means 

 supreme. But with a wider and deeper knowledge of 

 its environment, with the memory of past experiences, 

 carried by the higher locomotive powers into new sur- 

 roundings, brought face to face with new emergencies 

 outside of the range of its old instincts, it is compelled to 

 try some experiments of its own. It begins to modify 

 these instincts, and in time altogether does away with 

 many of them. It has risen a little above its old abject 

 slavery to the appetites, it is slowly throwing off the 

 bondage to heredity. New emotions or motives have 

 arisen appealing directly to the individual will. The 

 heir has been long enough under guardians and re- 

 gents, it assumes the government and can rightly say, 

 " L'etat, c'est moi." 



But a greater problem confronts it ; can it rise above 

 self ? The animal often seems absolutely selfish. Can 

 the unselfish be developed out of the selfish? This 

 seems at first sight impossible. And the first lessons 

 are so easy, the first steps so short, that we do not 



