44 THE EVOLUTION OF LIVING BEINGS. 



considered rightly as a kind of genus, and speaks of it 

 as such), as a group. About this he said: 



„La notion de I'espece n'est point celle d'un objet 



collectif comme I'entend M. de Candolle la forme 



„specifique, qui 6quivaut k I'etre, a la substance, est 

 „identique chez tous les individus d'une meme esp^ce 

 „et tou jours independante du nombre.... ainsi le 

 „premier homme que Dieu a cr66 renfermait en lui 

 „rhumanit6 entiere" *). 



„En assimilant, comme il le fait, les genres aux es- 

 „peces M. Alph. de Candolle ne prend pas garde qu'il 

 „assimile les cat6gories, qui renferment les etres aux 

 „etres eux-memes. 



„Le genre n'a pas I'etre, il n'est connaissable que 

 „parceque notre intelligence le constitue etre de raison. 

 „I1 existe dans notre intelligence, mais en dehors d'elle 

 „ce n'est pas un etre, c'est un non-etre qui n'a la v6rite 

 „que par les conceptions de notre esprit." 



„Now there is a good deal of truth in this, and Jor- 

 dan's conclusions are well worth considering, but it is 

 not the whole truth. 



The argumentation looses too much sight of the 

 fact that primarily nature can make nothing but indi- 

 viduals. 



If but two homozygotic individuals existed — each 

 of a different constitution — we would yet be able to 

 say that there lived two species on our globe, so that it 

 is true that species are realities „ind6pendantes du 



^) This example is ill chosen; „rhumaiiit6entidre" is not a single spe- 

 cies, as Jordan would doubtless have been the first to have argued him- 

 self, if he had not been hampered, in this respect, by religious scruples. 



