THE DOG AND THE LAW. 
lay no trap. Or again, he may come as a 
trespasser, and as such he can only recover 
when the cause of his injuries takes the 
form of a nuisance or is intrinsically un- 
lawful—e.g. the setting of spring guns. In 
each of these three cases, however, 1t may 
be open to the householder to set up ‘‘ No- 
tice’ as a defence, which means that he 
must show he gave notice of the danger, 
and that this danger was known and appre- 
ciated to its fullest extent. 
The bare notice “ Beware of the Dog ”’ is, 
perhaps, with one exception only, of no 
practical value, as it serves merely to intimate 
that a dog is kept, and does nothing to indicate 
from what quarter danger may be expected. 
The notice, to be legally effective, must be 
more precise. It should state, for example, 
that a fierce dog is at large, and if after this 
warning a person elects to run the risk, and 
is injured in consequence, he will be held 
to be the author of his own hurt, upon the 
maxim Volent: non fit injurta. (Brock v. 
Copeland, 1 Esp., 203. Daly v. Arral, 24 Sc., 
L.R. 150. Smillie v. Boyd, Sc. L.R. 148. 
Stolt v. Wilks, 22 F. and F.). Further, the 
notice must be fairly brought home to the 
plaintiff, and fully understood by him. 
Thus in Sarch v. Blackburn, 4 C. and P. 297, 
the plaintiff was enabled to recover because, 
although a notice was published, it was 
proved that he was quite unable to read. 
Again in Curtis v. Mills, 5 C. and P. 489, the 
plaintiff was warned not to go near the 
dog, which was tied up and insufficiently 
secured. In this case it was held he was 
entitled to recover if the jury were of opinion 
that he had not himself been negligent. 
If no warning or an inadequate warning 
is given, any person coming on lawful 
authority or by licence will be entitled to 
recover damages for injuries received, pro- 
vided he did not know from other sources 
the extent of the existing danger. 
As regards a trespasser by night the bare 
notice ‘“‘ Beware of the Dog ”’ will be suffi- 
cient (Stolt v. Wilks, supra), for it is precisely 
against this class that watch dogs are let 
loose. But in all cases it is well to bear in 
mind that the man who chooses to keep a 
savage dog and allow him to roam at large 
559 
is prima facte liable, and upon him rests the 
burden of proving that the aggrieved party 
either (1) fully appreciated the risk he was 
running under the above maxim, or (2) 
was a trespasser. 
With regard to the other notice referred to 
above, viz. “‘ Dogs will be shot,” this is a 
notice which is frequently to be seen in 
sporting districts ; whether it is of any value 
or not is extremely doubtful. As far as the 
law is concerned, if it has any significance 
at all, it can only serve merely as a warning 
to dog owners that if the owner or occupier 
of the place wherein it is exhibited, or any 
of his servants, catch a dog red-handed in the 
act of trespassing and actually doing damage 
to the freehold or animals thereon, he or 
they are justified in shooting him if unable 
otherwise to prevent his doing the damage. 
It does not mean that stray dogs although 
trespassing and hunting about in search of 
game can be shot at sight. Cases on this 
point are: Vere v. Cawdor, 1809, 11 East 568, 
Clark v. Webster, 1 C. and P. ro4, Corner 
v. Champneys, 2 March, 584. “A dog,” 
said Lord Ellenborough, ‘‘ does not incur 
the penalty of death for running after a 
hare on another man’s ground.” To justify 
shooting it must be proved that the dog 
at the time was actually in the act of killing ; 
(Jansen v. Brown, 1 C. 41), and in Wells v. 
Head, 4 C. and P. 568. Shooting was held 
unjustifiable because, although a sheep had 
been worried to death, the dog was running 
away when shot, and the killing was not, 
therefore, in the protection of property. 
It appears, however, that in ancient parks 
and free warrens remnants of the old Forest 
Law still survive, and in Protheroe uv. 
Matthews, 5 C. and P. 581, it was decided 
that the owner of a park was entitled to 
shoot dogs which were chasing deer, although 
they were not actually chasing at the 
moment, and it was not absolutely necessary 
to destroy them to preserve the game. 
Again in the case of Barrington v. Turner, 
3 Lev., 28, the applicant’s deer had trespassed 
on land belonging to the respondent, who 
set his dogs on to drive them back. The 
dogs, as is their nature on such occasions, 
exceeded their orders, and not only did they 
