70 THE NEW 
ion 
to conflicting judicial opinions. Blackburn, 
J., in the case of Liver Alkali Company v. 
Johnson, said: “It is difficult to see any 
reason why the lability of a shipowner who 
engages to carry the whole lading of his 
ship for one person should be less than the 
liability of one who carries lading in different 
parcels for different people.’ And he added 
that the liability of a lighterman was ex- 
pressly recognised as being the same as that 
of a common carrier. Brett, J. (afterwards 
Lord Esher, M.R.), held on a review of 
the authorities that shipowners, though not 
common carriers, yet by custom, 7.e. the 
common law of England, have the same 
liability. “‘ Every shipowner who carries 
goods for hire in his ship, whether by inland 
navigation or coastways or abroad, under- 
takes to carry them at his own risk, the act 
of God and the Queen’s enemies alone 
excepted, unless by agreement between 
himself and the particular freighter on the 
particular voyage he hmits his lability by 
further exceptions.” In the case of Nugent 
v. Smith (I.C.P.D. 25 and 427), Brett, J., 
repeated this opinion, but when this case 
was taken higher on appeal, Cockburn, C.J., 
in his judgment, dissented emphatically from 
Brett, J., and also from Blackburn, J., in 
his judgment in the other case, saying there 
was a clear distinction between the common 
carrier and the private ship. It seems, 
however, that the balance of authority and 
principle is in favour of the view expressed 
by the late Lord Esher, supported as it is 
by the judgments of other able judges, such 
as Lord Justice Bowen, who in the well- 
known case of Hamilton v. Pandorf, used 
very similar language. 
The shipowner, nowadays, in carrying 
anything, seeks to limit his liability in every 
way that he possibly can, his bill of lading 
is invariably full of exceptions, limiting his 
liability as far as it is possible for the human 
mind to conceive. This is especially so in 
connection with the shippers of dogs, horses, 
and other animals, and when a dog does on 
its voyage meet with any injury, or is maybe 
lost, it may, as a general rule, be safely stated 
that it is hopeless to bring any action against 
the shipowner on account of the same, no 
BOOK 
OF THE. (DOG; 
matter how the injury or loss has occurred. 
Of course if a shipowner is so foolish as to 
ship a dog without a bill of lading, and 
the dog be injured or lost on account of 
something which cannot be called an act 
of God or of the King’s enemies, another 
situation altogether arises, and the dog 
owner would find himself in clover, but 
“Simple Simons”? among shipowners are 
nowadays not numerous, and though it is 
true no number of express exceptions in a 
bill of lading can of a certainty be said to 
be exhaustive, yet so many cases have 
arisen of recent years between shipowners 
and shippers, and so many judgments have 
been given that the exceptions in these 
agreements must now not only cover almost 
everything, but are worded in such a way 
that even the ingenuity of great lawyers 
will, as a rule, fail to get behind them. 
An interesting case, recently tried in the 
High Court before Mr. Justice Walton, is a 
good example of what a poor chance a dog- 
owner has against a shipowner. In this 
case (Packwood v. Union Castle Mail Steam- 
ship Company) the plaintiff shipped two 
prize Collies in a kennel from London to 
Cape Town under a bill of lading, which 
contained the following among other terms 
and conditions: ‘‘On deck at shipper’s 
risk. Ship not accountable for mortality, 
disease or accidents”’; ‘‘ The company are 
not liable for, or for the consequences of, any 
accidents, loss, or damage whatsoever arising 
from any act, neglect, or default whatsoever 
of the masters, officers, crew or any agent 
or servant of the company ”’; and ‘‘ No claim 
that may arise in respect of goods shipped 
under this bill of lading will be recoverable 
unless made at the port of delivery within 
seven days from the completion of the ship’s 
discharge there.” 
The dogs were duly shipped on board 
the s.s. Galician, and during the voyage one 
of them was lost overboard, in consequence 
of its being let out of its kennel by someone 
in the employ of the defendants, and being 
allowed to go loose about the ship for the 
purpose, as the defendants alleged, ‘ of 
getting exercise, which was a_ reasonable 
measure necessary for the health of the said 
