I lo The Descent of Man. Pakt I 



of his fellow-mer , and unfortunately very often by his own strong 

 selfish desires. But as love, sympathy and self-command become 

 strengthened by habit, and as the power of reasoning becomes 

 clearer, so that man can value justly the judgments of his 

 fellows, he will feel himself impelled, apart from any transitory 

 pleasure or pain, to certain lines of conduct. He might then 

 declare— not that any barbarian or uncultivated man could 

 thus think— I am the supreme judge of my own conduct, and in 

 the words of Kant, I will not in my own person violate the 

 dignity of humanity. 



The more enduring Social Instincts conquer the less persistent 

 Instincts. — We have not, however, as yet considered the main 

 point, on which, from our present point of view, the whole 

 question of the moral sense turns. "Why should a man feel that 

 he ought to obey one instinctive desire rather than another? 

 Why is he bitterly regretful, if he has yielded to a strong sense 

 of self-preservation, and has not risked his life to save that of a 

 fellow-creature ? or why does he regret having stokn food from 

 hunger ? 



It is evident in the first place, that with mankind the instinc- 

 tive impulses have different degrees of strength ; a savage will 

 risk his own life to save that of a member of the same community, 

 but will be wholly indifferent about a stranger : a young and 

 timid mother urged by the maternal instinct will, without a 

 moment's hesitation, run the greatest danger for her own infant, 

 but not for a mere fellow-creature. Nevertheless many a 

 civilized man, or even boy, who never before risked his life for 

 another, but full of courage and sympathy, has diregarded 

 the instinct of self-preservation, and plunged at once into a 

 torrent to save a drowning man, though a stranger. In this case 

 man is impelled by the same instinctive motive, which made the 

 heroic little American monkey, formerly described, save his 

 keeper, by attacking the great and dreaded baboon. Such 

 actions as the above appear to be the simple result of the greater 

 strength of the social or maternal instincts than that of any 

 other instinct or motive; for they are performed too instan- 

 taneously for reflection, or for pleasure or pain to be felt at the 

 time ; though, if prevented by any cause, distress or even misery 

 might be felt. In a timid man, on the other hand, the instinct 

 of self-preservation might be so strong, that he would be unable 

 to force himself to run any such risk, perhaps not even for his 

 ovvn child. 



1 am aware that some persons maintain that actions performed 

 impulsively, as in the above cases, do not come under th« 

 dominion of the moral sense, and cannot be called moral. Tliej 



