!3nAi'. IV. Moral Sense. 1 1 1 



confine this term to actions done deliberately, after a victory 

 over opposing desires, or when prompted by some exalted 

 motive. But it appears scarcely possible to draw any clear line 

 of distinction of this kind.''" As far as exalted motives are 

 concerned, many instances have been recorded of savages, 

 destitute of any feeling of general benevolence towards mankind, 

 and not guided' by any religious motive, who have deliberately 

 sacrificed their lives as prisoners,^" rather than betray their 

 comrades ; and surely their conduct ought to be considered as 

 moral. As far as deliberation, and the victory over opposing 

 motives are concerned, animals may be seen doubting between 

 opposed instincts, in rescuing their offspring or comrades 

 from danger ; yet their actions, though done for the good of 

 others, are not called moral. Moreover, anything performed 

 very often by us, will at last be done without deliberation or 

 hesitation, and can then hardly be distinguished from an 

 instinct; yet surely no one will pretend that such an action 

 ceases to be moral. On the contrary, we all feel that an act 

 cannot be considered as perfect, or as performed in the most 

 noble manner, unless it be done impulsively, without deliberation 

 or effort, in the same manner as by a man in whom the requisite 

 qualities are innate. He who is forced to overcome his fear or 

 want of sympathy before he acts, deserves, however, in one way 

 higher credit than the man whose innate disposition leads him 

 to a good act without effort. As we cannot distinguish between 

 motives, we rank all actions of a certain class as moral, if 

 performed by a moral being. A moral being is one who is 

 capable of comparing his past and future actions or motives, and 

 of approving or disapproving of them. We have no reason to 

 suppose that any of the lower animals have this capacity; 

 therefore, when a Newfoundland dog drags a child out of the 

 water, or a monkey faces danger to rescue its comrade, or takes 

 charge of an orphan monkey, we do not call its conduct moral. 

 But in the case of man, who alone can with certainty be ranked 

 as a moral being, actions of a certain class are called moral, 

 whether performed deliberately, after a struggle with opposing 



^^ I refei' here to the distinction *' material and formal morality is 



between what has been called Trui' " as irrelevant as other such dis- 



teriiil and formal morality. I am " tinctions." 



glad to find that Prof. Huxley ('Cri- ^^ I have given one such case, 



tiques and Addresses,' 1873, p. 287) namely of three Patagonian Indians 



takes the same view on this subject who preferred being shot, one after 



as I do. Mr. Leslie Stephen re- the other, to betraying the plans ol 



marks (' Essays on Freethinking and their companions in war (' Joiirnai 



Plain Speaking,' 1873, p. 83), "the of Researches,' 1845, p. 103). 

 " metaphysical distinction between 



