r 14 TJie Descent of Man. Pakt I. 



A-t the moment of action, man will no doubt be apt to follo-w 

 the stronger impulse; and though this may occasionally 

 prompt him to the noblest deeds, it will more commonly lead 

 him to gratify his own desires at the expense of other men. 

 But after their gratification, when past and weaker impressions 

 are judged by the ever-enduring social instinct, and by his deep 

 regard for the good opinion of his fellows, retribution will surely 

 come. He will then feel remorse, repentance, regret, or shame ; 

 this latter feeling, however, relates almost exclusively to the 

 judgment of others. He will consequently resolve more or less 

 firmly to act differently for the future ; and this is conscience ; for 

 conscience looks backwards, and serves as a guide for the future. 



The nature and strength of the feelings which we call regret, 

 shame, repentance or remorse, depend apparently not only on 

 the strength of the violated instinct, but partly on the strength 

 of the temptation, and often still more on the judgment of 

 our fellows. How far each man values the appreciation of 

 others, depends on the strength of his innate or acquired 

 feeling of sympathy ; and on his own capacity for reasoning out 

 the remote consequences of his acts. Another element is most 

 important, although not necessary, the reverence or fear of the 

 Gods, or Spirits believed in by each man : and this apphes 

 especially in cases of remorse. Several critics have objected 

 that though some slight regret or repentance may be explained 

 by the view advocated in this chapter, it is impossible thus to 

 account for the soul-shaking feeling of remorse. But I can see 

 little force in this objection. My critics do not define what 

 they mean by remorse, and I can find no definition implying 

 more than an overwhelming sense of repentance. Eemorse 

 seems to bear the same relation to repentance, as rage does to 

 anger, or agony to pain. It is far from strange that an instinct 

 so strong and so generally admired, as maternal love, should, if 

 disobeyed, lead to the deepest misery, as soon as the impression 

 of the past cause of disobedience is weakened. Even when an 

 action is opposed to no special instinct, merely to know that our 

 friends and equals despise us for it is enough to cause great 

 misery. Who can doubt that the refusal to fight a duel through 

 fear has caused many men an agony of shame ? Many a Hindoo, 

 it is said, has been stirred to the bottom of his soul by having 

 partaken of unclean food. Here is another case of what must, I 

 think, be called remorse. Dr. Landor acted as a magistrate in 

 West Australia, and relates,^' that a native on his farm, aftei 

 lotiing one of his wives from disease, came and said that " he was 



'"^ ' In-sanity ic Relation to Law;' Ontario, United States, 1871, p. 14. 



