( 1 6 The Descent of Man. Pabt 1 



comes to feel, through acquired and perhaps inherited habit, that 

 it is best for him to obey liis more persistent impulses. The 

 imperious word oayld seems merely to imply the consciousness of 

 the existence of a rule of conduct, however it may liavo 

 originated. Formerly it must have been often vehemently 

 urged that an insulted gentleman ought to fight a duel. We 

 even say that a pointer ought to point, and a retriever to 

 retrieve game. If they fail to do so, they fail in their duty 

 and act wrongly. 



If any desire or instinct leading to an action opposed to the 

 good of others still appears, when recalled to mind, as strong 

 as, or stronger than, the social instinct, a man ■Nvill feel no keen 

 regret at having followed it ; but he will be conscious that if his 

 conduct were known to his fellows, it would meet with their 

 disapprobation ; and few are so destitute of sympathy as not to 

 feel discomfort when this is realised. If he has no such 

 sympathy, and if his desires leading to bad actions are at the 

 time strong, and when recalled are not over-mastered by the 

 persistent social instincts, and the judgment of others, then he 

 is essentially a bad man ; *" and the sole restraining motive left 

 is the fear of punishment, and the conviction that in the long 

 run it would be best for his own selfish interests to regard the 

 good of others rather than his own. 



It is obvious that every one may with an easy conscience 

 gratify his own desires, if they do not interfere with his social 

 instincts, that is with the good of others ; but in order to be quite 

 free from self-reproach, or at least of anxiety, it is almost neces- 

 sary for him to avoid the disapprobation, whether reasonable or 

 not, of his fellow-men. Nor must he break through the fixed 

 habits of his life, especially if these are supported by reason; 

 for if he does, he will assuredly feel dissatisfaction. He must 

 likewise avoid the reprobation of the one God or gods in whom, 

 according to his knowledge or superstition, he may believe ; but 

 in this case the additional fear of divine punishment often 

 supervenes. 



The strictly Social Virtues at first alone regarded. — The above 

 view of the origin and nature of the moral sense, which tells us 

 what we ought to do, and of the conscience which reproves us if 

 we disobey it, accords well with what we see of the early and 

 undeveloped condition of this faculty in mankind. The virtues 

 which must be practised, at least generally, by rude men, so 



•• Dr. Prosper Despine, in his many curious cases of the worst 

 I'sjchologie Naturelle,' 1868 (torn. criminals, who apparently have beeD 

 p. 243; torn. ii. p 169) gives entirely destitute of conscience. 



