Chai'. IV. Moral Sense. 121 



for the general good rather than for the general happiness of the 

 species. The term, general good, may be defined as the rearing 

 of the greatest number of individuals in full vigour and health, 

 with all their faculties perfect, under the conditions to which 

 they are subjected. As the social instincts both of man and the 

 lower animals have no doubt been developed by nearly the same 

 steps, it would be advisable, if found practicable, to use the 

 same definition in both cases, and to take as the standard of 

 morality, the general good or welfare of the community, rather 

 than the general happiness ; but this definition would perhaps 

 require some limitation on account of political ethics. 



When a man risks his life to save that of a fellow-creature, it 

 seems also more correct to say that he acts for the general good, 

 rather than for the general happiness of mankind. No doubt 

 the welfare and the happiness of the individual usually coincide ; 

 and a contented, happy tribe will flourish better than one that 

 is discontented and unhappy. We have seen that even at an 

 early period in the history of man, the expressed wishes of the 

 community will have naturally influenced to a large extent the 

 conduct of each member ; and as all wish for happiness, the 

 " greatest happiness principle " will have become a most im- 

 portant secondary guide and object ; the social instinct, however, 

 together with sympathy (which leads to our regarding the 

 approbation and disapprobation of others), having served as the 

 primary impulse and guide. Thus the reproach is removed of 

 laying the foundation of the noblest part of our nature in the 

 base principle of selfishness; unless, indeed, the satisfaction 

 which every animal feels, when it follows its proper instincts, 

 and the dissatisfaction felt when prevented, be called selfish. 



The wishes and opinions of the members of the same community, 

 expressed at first orally, but later by writing also, either form 

 the sole guides of our conduct, or greatly reinforce the social 

 instincts ; such opinions, however, have sometimes a tendency 

 directly opposed to these instincts. This latter fact is well 

 exemplified by the Law of Honour, that is, the law of the opinion 

 of our equals, and not of all our countrymen. The breach of 

 this law, even when the breach is known to be strictly accordant 

 with true morality, has caused many a man more agony than a 

 real crime. We recognise the same influence in the burning 

 sense of shame which most of us have felt, even after the interval 

 of years, when calling to mind some accidental breach of a 

 trifling, though fixed, rule of etiquette. The judgment of the 

 community will generally be guided by some rude experience of 

 what is best in the long run for all the members ; but this judg- 

 ment will not rarely err from ignorance and weak powers tA 



