122 The Descent of Man. Part 1 



reason'ng. Hence the strangest customs and superstitions, in 

 complete opposition to the true welfare and happiness of man- 

 kind, have become all-po-werful throughout the world. We se^ 

 this in the horror felt by a Hindoo who breaks his caste, and 

 in many other such cases. It would he difficult to distinguish 

 between the remorse felt by a Hindoo who has yielded to the 

 temptation of eating unclean food, from that felt after committing 

 s theft ; but the former would probably be the more severe. 



How so many absurd rules of conduct, as well as so many 

 absurd religious beliefs, have originated, we do not know ; nor 

 how it is that they have become, in all quarters of the world, so 

 deeply impressed on the mind of men; but it is worthy of 

 remark that a belief constantly inculcated during the early years 

 of life, whilst the brain is impressible, appears to acquire almost 

 the nature of an instinct ; and the very essence of an instinct is 

 that it is followed independently of reason. Neither can we say 

 why certain admirable virtues, such as the love of truth, are 

 much more highly appreciated by some savage tribes than by 

 others ;■*' nor, again, why similar differences prevail even amongst 

 highly civilised nations. Knowing how firmly fixed many 

 strange customs and superstitions have become, we need feel no 

 surprise that the self-regarding virtues, supported as they are by 

 reason, should now appear to us so natural as to be thought 

 innate, although they were not valued by man in bis early 

 condition. 



Notwithstanding many sources of doubt, man can generally 

 and readily distinguish between the higher and lower moral 

 rules. The higher are founded on the social instincts, and relate 

 to the welfare of others. They are supported by the approbation 

 of our fellow-men and by reason. The lower rules, though some 

 of them when implying self-sacrifice hardly deserve to be called 

 lower, relate chiefly to self, and arise from public opinion, ma- 

 tured by experience and cultivation ; for they are not practised 

 by rude tribes. 



As man advances in civilisation, and small tribes are united 

 into larger communities, the simplest reason would tell each 

 individual that he ought to extend his social instincts and 

 sympathies to all the members of the same nation, though 

 personally unknown to him. This point being once reached, 

 there is only an artificial barrier to prevent his sympathies 

 extending to the men of all nations and races. If, indeed, such 

 men are separated from him by great differences in appearance 



" Good instances are given by in his 'Contributions to tlie Tlieorj 

 Mr. Wallace in 'ricientifio Upiujon,' of Natural Selection,' 187U, p. iiVi. 

 Sept. 15, .809 ; acd more fully 



