Ctup. [V. Simnnary. 125 



and other useless members of society, and. finallj to the lower 

 animals, — so would the standard of his morality rise higher and 

 higher. And it is admitted by moralists of the derivative 

 school and by some intuitionists, that the standard of morality 

 has risen since an early period in the history of man.** 



As a struggle may sometimes be seen going on between the 

 various instincts of the lower animals, it is not surprising that 

 there should be a struggle in man between his social instincts, 

 with their derived virtues, and his lower, though momentarily 

 stronger impulses or desires. This, as Mr. Galton*" has remarked, 

 is all the less surprising, as man has emerged from a state ol 

 barbarism within a comparatively recent period. After having 

 yielded to some temptation we feel a sense of dissatisfaction, 

 shame, repentance, or remorse, analogous to the feelings caused 

 by other powerful instincts or desires, when left unsatisfied or 

 baulked. We compare the weakened impression of a past 

 temptation with the ever present social instincts, or with habits, 

 gained in early youth and strengthened during our whole lives, 

 imtil they have become almost as strong as instincts. If with 

 the temptation still before us we do not yield, it is because 

 either the social instinct or some custom is at the moment 

 predominant, or because we have learnt that it will appear to us 

 hereafter the stronger, when compared with the weakened im- 

 pression of the temptation , and we realise that its violation would 

 cause us suffering. Looking to future generations, there is no 

 cause to fear that the social instincts will grow weaker, and we 

 may expect that virtuous habits will grow stronger, becoming 

 perhaps fixed by inheritance. In this case the struggle between 

 our higher and lower impulses will be less severe, and virtue 

 will be triumphant. 



Siimrtiaiy tif Ihe laU two Chapterf. — lhere can be no doubt that 

 the difference between the mind of the lowest man and that of 

 the highest animal is immense. An anthropomorphous ape, if 

 he could take a dispassionate view of his own case, would adjnit 

 that though he could form an artful plan to plunder a garden — 

 though he could use stones for fighting or for breaking open 

 nuts, yet that the thought of fashioning a stone into a tool was 



*' A writer in tlie ' North British coincide therein. 

 Review' (July 1869, p. 531), well " See his remarlcable work ou 



capable of t'orraing a sound judg- 'Hereditary Genins,' 1869, p. 349. 



ment, expresses himself strongly in The Duke of Argyll (' PrimeTal 



favour of this conclusion. Mr. Man," 1869, p. 188) has some good 



Ucky (■ Hist, of Morals,' vol. i. p. remarks on tlie contest in man'l 



143) seems to a certain extent to nature between right and wrong. 



