194 INJURIES TO ANIMALS ON HIGHWAYS. 



Dudley^ it was held broadly that where a horse, frightened 

 by an accident, breaks away from his driver and escapes from 

 all control and afterwards is injured by a defect in the high- 

 way, the town is not liable in damages unless the final accident 

 would have happened even if the horse had been under con- 

 trol. The court distinguished Palmer v. Andover thus: 

 "Here the accident and injury were not coincident, but were 

 separate and produced by separate causes. The effect of the 

 accident as a procuring cause was complete when the horse, 

 frightened by the falling of the crossbar and thills upon his 

 heels, became detached from the sleigh and had escaped from 

 the control of the driver. The blind violence of the animal, 

 acting without guidance or direction, became, in the course 

 and order of incidents which ensued, the supervening and 

 proximate cause of the injury inflicted by his running against 

 the wood-pile, which constituted an unlawful obstruction and 

 defect in the highway. In this succession of events, it hap- 

 pened that the accident placed the owner in a situation where 

 it was out of his power to exercise the care over the horse 

 while this new cause was in operation and until it had con- 

 tributed to produce the disaster by which his leg was broken." 

 This case has been followed in the later cases and undoubt- 

 edly lays down the law as it is at this day : the defect in the 

 highway must have been the sole cause of the injury, in order 

 for the plaintiff to recover.^ Accordingly towns are not re- 

 quired to fence their roads with a view to prevent a frightened 

 animal from escaping out of them. The essential fact where 

 a railing is required is that there is some dangerous object 

 outside upon which the traveller may come, if not sufficiently 



' 4 Allen (Mass.) 557. 



'"See Titus v. Northbridge, 97 Mass. 258; Horton v. Taunton, Ibid. 

 266 n.; Babson v. Rockport, loi id. 93; Wright v. Templeton, 132 id. 49; 

 Fogg V. Nahant, 106 id. 278, where it is said: "If, without his fault or 

 negligence on his part, his horses have escaped from his control, ... and 

 this condition of things is not produced by a defect in the way, the town 

 is not responsible." 



