INJURIES FROM FRIGHT AND DEFECT IN HIGHWAY. 197 



In such cases the consequences of the neglect of duty are 

 natural and probable and ought therefore to be foreseen. 

 But when, from extraordinary causes, for the existence of 

 which the supervisors are not responsible and of which they 

 cannot be presumed to have had notice, a driver loses control 

 of his horses and they come in contact with a defect in the 

 highway, there is no more reason for holding the township 

 answerable for a resultant injury than there is for holding any 

 other party responsible for the result of the concurrence of 

 something which he could not foresee with his negligence. 

 . . . The cases must be rare in which an injury can be said 

 to be the result of the negligence of a party when there is an- 

 other and primary efficient proximate cause, wholly independ- 

 ent of such negligence and for which the party charged with 

 negligence is in no way responsible. In such cases it would 

 be incumbent on the plaintiff to show that the accident would 

 have happened without the concurrence of the primary effi- 

 cient proximate cause." ^* 



With reference to the degree of care that municipal authori- 

 ties must exercise in order to avoid the consequences of the 

 fright of animals, it was said in Lower Macungie Tp. v. 

 Merkhoffer :^* "It was not a defence to the township to show 

 that by careful driving accident might have been avoided at 

 the place in question. That would fall far short of what is 

 the purpose of a public highway. It must be kept in such 

 repair that even skittish animals may be employed without 

 risk of danger on it, by reason of the condition of the road." 



So, if a dangerous place is left unfenced and a horse in con- 

 sequence of sudden fright goes over it, the municipality is lia- 

 ble,^^ and it is no defence that the injury was the combined 



" Schaeffer v. Jackson Tp., 150 Pa. St. 145. See also Chartiers Tp. v. 

 Phillips, 122 id. 601. 



" 71 Pa. St. 276, 280. But see Trexler v. Greenwich Tp., 168 id. 214, 

 where this statement is qualified and called "too broad." 



"' Hey V. Philadelphia, 81 Pa. St. 44; Newlin Tp. v. Davis, 77 id. 317; 

 Pittston V. Hart, 89 id. 389; Wellman v. Susq. Depot, 167 id. 239; 

 Plymouth Tp. v. Graver, 125 id. 24; Kitchen v. Union Tp., 171 id., 145; 



