216 INJURIES TO ANIMALS ON HIGHWAYS. 



with which the hoi'se does not come into contact f^ or a stone 

 against which the wheel scrapes, making a noise. ^* "It is 

 well settled in this Commonwealth that cities and towns are 

 not liable for injuries caused by the fright of horses from ob- 

 jects in the highway, even if the object is one that would be 

 ever so likely to frighten horses. Can it make any difference 

 whether the fright is from sight or sound? In general and 

 on principle, we think the answer should unhesitatingly be, 

 No." The question as to whether the scraping was the prox- 

 imate cause of the injury was, however, held to be for the 

 jury.®^ 



Nor is the fact that the horse would have come into con- 

 tact with the object if he had not been frightened, a material 

 one. On a second hearing of Cook v. Charlestown, supra, 

 it was said : "The bill of exceptions now presented contains 

 but one statement of fact which distinguishes the case from 

 that which was before us upon the exceptions taken at the 

 previous trial. . . . That fact is that when the plaintiff's horse 

 was frightened at the dead horse in the street and ran away, 

 he was going directly upon it, was within a few feet of it and 

 would have gone upon it if he had not sprung to one side. 

 This does not, in our opinion, change the aspect of the case 

 materially. . . . Nor can it make any difference that the ob- 

 ject which frightened the horse is one which would have been 

 an obstruction and defect in the way if he had come in con- 

 tact with it. It is not its quaUty as an obstruction which 

 causes the injury complained of, but its quality as an object 

 of terror to the horse. There is nothing to show that the 

 horse was more frightened than he would have been if it had 

 lain close beside his path, instead of directly in it." *® 



Where a gentle horse is obliged to step aside by reason of 

 an object in the highway, the town is liable for the resulting 

 injury — not where he shies as the consequence of a vicious 



■" Cook V. Montague, 115 Mass. 571. 



"• Bowes z'. Boston, 155 Mass: 344. " Ibid. 



" 98 Mass. 80. 



