222 INJURIES TO ANIMALS ON HIGHWAYS. 



gutter, and the horses ran away and were killed, it was held 

 that one owning property next to the street has the right to 

 obstruct traffic temporarily in the street when it is necessary 

 to take articles from or to his place of business, but not to use 

 the street for the purpose of storing property to the damage 

 of others.^i^ A person, it has been held, even if he is the 

 owner of land over which a highway passes, commits a 

 nuisance, if he places in the highway an obstruction with 

 which horses or vehicles may come in contact or which is 

 calculated to frighten horses of ordinary gentleness, unless 

 the obstruction is reasonably necessary for the conduct of his 

 business and at the same time does not unreasonably interfere 

 with the right of the pubHc to use the highway.^^® 



In Connecticut, the Massachusetts rule as to the non- 

 liability of the town for the fright of horses is not followed, 

 and it is held that objects that would cause fright to horses 

 of ordinary gentleness are a defect for which the town is lia- 

 ble, if the plaintiff observes proper caution^^" The court 

 said in Ayer v. Norwich: "It is conceded. that the object is 

 a nuisance. It must also be conceded that the nuisance in 

 both cases is the direct and immediate cause of the injury, and 

 that the injury is the natural and probable consequence of the 

 nuisance. If I strike a horse and cause him to run, whereby 

 persons in the carriage are injured, I am liable in trespass for 

 all the damage. If by my negligence I frighten him and 

 thereby cause injury, I am liable in case. If a town or other 

 corporation by its negligence produce the same result, why 

 should it not be liable? We must confess we are unable to 

 discover any good reason for holding towns liable for injuries 

 caused by collision and not liable for injuries caused by fright. 



"' Stewart v. Porter Mfg. Co., 13 N. Y. St. Repr. 220. That the use 

 of a steam roller is not a technical "defect," see Mullen v. Glens Falls, 

 II N. Y. App. Div. 275. 



"• Tinker v. N. Y., O. & W. R. Co., 157 N. Y. 312. 



^'"' Dimock v. Sufiield, 30 Conn. 129; Hewison v. New Haven, 34 id. 

 136, 142; Ayer v. Norwich, 39 id. 376. And see the note to Hewison v. 

 New Haven, 7 Am. L. Reg. N. S. ^^^. 



