EVIDENCE ; DAMAGES. 255 



competent to prove that his previous conduct was not ac- 

 cidental or unusual, but frequent and the result of a fixed 

 habit at the time of the accident." ^*^ In a Rhode Island 

 case, however, it was held that testimony as to the behavior 

 or disposition of a horse subsequent to the accident, even if 

 theoretically admissible, should be excluded as impracticable 

 and confusing.^^^ 



If a horse's disposition is such that when exposed to or- 

 dinary objects and noises on a highway he becomes unman- 

 ageable with a driver of ordinary care and skill, and this con- 

 tributes to the injury, the plaintiff cannot recover.^^^ So, a 

 habit of stumbling may be shown ;^^* or that the horse had 

 defective vision.^^^ But where the question was of the plain- 

 tiff's contributory negligence in driving over a bridge with 

 no guards or railings a horse blind in one eye, it was held that 

 text-books relating to the effect of blindness in horses were 

 inadmissible in evidence, since the subject was not one of ex- 

 pert testimony but depended on a knowledge of the disposi- 

 tion of the particular animal.^*® 



Where as the result of an accident a horse ran away, it was 

 held that evidence showing that a horse once doing this will 

 do so again when the opportunity occurs, is admissible on 



^" Todd V. Rowley, 8 Allen (Mass.) 51. And see Maggi v. Cutts, 123 

 Mass. 535; Chamberlain v. Enfield, 43 N. H. 356. 



"" Stone V. Langworthy (R. I.), 40 Atl. Rep. 832. 



'" Bliss V. Wilbraham, 8 Allen (Mass.) 564. 



And see Bailey v. Belfast (Me.), 10 Atl. Rep. 452. Where the defendant 

 alleged that the mare was a vicious animal and had not been used by a 

 former owner, the plaintiflf was allowed to show in rebuttal that the reason 

 she had not been used was because the owner had so many horses that 

 he had not work for all of them: Potter v. Natural Gas Co., 183 Pa. 



St. 575. 



'" Patterson v. South. & North. Ala. R. Co., 89 Ala. 318. 



And where the plaintiflf had opportunities of observing, it need not 

 be shown that he actually knew of the habit: Judd v. Claremont, 66 

 N. H. 418. 



"' Wright V. Templeton, 132 Mass. 49. 



■™ Gould V. Schermer, loi la. 582. 



