354 impounding; injuries on highways, etc. 



mals so dying were sometimes taken to market and sold for 

 food and that the removal was by direction of the city in- 

 spector was held not to be a sufficient justification in an action 

 for converting the plaintifif's property. "A dead hog is not 

 per se a nuisance, even though it died of sufifocation, and is 

 not necessarily dangerous to public health. The owner may 

 still put it to a useful and innocent purpose." ^^* 



Where a city authorizes the removal from its limits of dead 

 animals, leaving the place and manner of disposing of them 

 to its marshal, it is liable for his negligence in removing them 

 to a place where they become a private nuisance on account 

 of the stench. ^^" So, the fact that the business of rendering 

 dead animals is one of great public convenience is no defence 

 to an indictment for keeping a nuisance in permitting car- 

 casses, offal and filth to be collected and deposited at the ren- 

 dering tanks to the prejudice of others. ^^^ 



A slaughter-house within city limits may be prohibited as 

 a nuisance.^^^ Otherwise, where it is at a reasonable distance 

 from the population and its business is not conducted negli- 

 gently or recklessly.^^^ But the best conducted slaughter- 

 house in the wrong place may be a nuisance.^^^ And it is 

 sufficient to constitute a slaughter-house a nuisance that its 

 odors are offensive to the senses, it not being necessary that 



"" Underwood v. Green, 42 N. Y. 140. 



"" Hillsboro v. Ivey, i Tex. Civ. App. 653. 



"'° Seacord z'. Peo., 121 III. 623. 



As to keeping carcasses on deposit in a borough without a license, see 

 Simpson v. Proctor, 23 Rettie (Sc. Ct. Justic.) 22. 



''" Ex parte Heilbron, 65 Cal. 609; Chicago v. Rumpff, 45 111. 90; Belling 

 V. Evansville, 144 Ind. 644; Rund v. Fowler, 142 id. 214; Seifried v. Hays, 

 81 Ky. 377; Woodyear v. Schaefer, 57 Md. i; Catlin v. Valentine, 9 Paige 

 (N. Y.) 575; Portland v. Meyer, 32 Oreg. 368. And see the cases cited 

 in 38 L, R. A. 646 n. 



The penalty of a slaughter of cattle may be imposed on a company that 

 allows persons to slaughter in a building: Liverpool New Cattle Market 

 Co. I'. Hudson, L. R. 2 Q. B. 131. 



=■" Beckham v. Brown (Ky.), 40 S. W. Rep. 684. 



=" Moses V. State, 58 Fed. Rep. 185. 



