SCIENTEE. 395 



The knowledge need not be of any specific act : knowledge 

 of a general vicious propensity is sufficient.®^ As was said 

 in a Washington case : "According to the more modern and 

 reasonable doctrine, it is not necessary that he should have 

 had actual positive notice. If he has notice that the disposi- 

 tion of the animal is such that it would be likely to commit 

 an injury similar to the one complained of, it is sufficient. It 

 is not necessary that the notice be of injury actually com- 

 mitted. Thus, in case of a dog known to be vicious and 

 ferocious by its keeper, it is unnecessary to show that he had 

 previously bitten any person. The keeper of such a dog 

 must see to it that he is kept securely or be responsible for all 

 injury done by him." ®'' 



So in an article in the Journal of Jurisprudence it is said: 

 "We do not think the dog is entitled to one worry or one bite. 

 In the first place, this doctrine is rather hard upon the man 

 who is privileged tO' receive the honor of the first bite. ... It 

 does seem to us that the distinction of the English law be- 

 tween the ferte naturce and ferce mansuetce is somewhat arti- 

 ficial, and is irrelevant to the question of fault and consequent 

 reparation. It is artificial because a dog is not originally and 

 is not necessarily a domesticated animal, any more than a 

 monkey is. Both may be tamed and both are. But some 

 traces of the wild blood do occasionally manifest themselves 

 with no apparent reason for it. . . . The real ground of lia- 

 bility is culpa. It is the scienter, the knowledge of the animal's 

 propensity to do hurt that fixes the date of the liability. But 



■^ Argersinger v. Lever, 17 N. Y. Civ. Proc. 352; McGarry v. N. Y. & 

 H. R. Co. 60 N. Y. Super. Ct. 367; McCaskill v. Elliott, 5 Strobh. L. 

 (S. C.) 196; Barnum v. Terpening, 75 Mich. 557; Renwick v. Von Rot- 

 berg, 2 Rettie (Sc. Ct. Sess.) 855; Worth v. Gilling, L. R. 2 C. P. i; 

 Charlwood v. Greig, 3 C. & K. 46; Wood v. Vaughan, 28 N. B. 472, 18 

 Can. Sup. Ct. 703. 



" Robinson v. Marino, 3 Wash. 434. 



And in Canada " 'the first bite' is not admitted as a defence to an action 

 for injury done by a dog, however good its reputation may have been 

 previously:" 13 Leg. News (Can.) 314. 



