GENERAL LIABILITY ; NEGLIGEKCE, ETC. 583: 



In Colorado it would seem that the company is liable only 

 where the animal is struck by the engine.*^ In Texas, where 

 the animal must be "injured by the locomotive and cars. 

 ... in running over" the railway, a company is not liable 

 foT an animal injured on a trestle through fright and not 

 by contact.*^ In a recent case, however, it was said: "The 

 decisions of our Court of Appeals, holding that to render a 

 railroad liable under our statute for stock killed it is necessary 

 to show actual contact with the cai's, do not apply to a 

 case where other negligence than a failure to fence the track 

 is shown to have been the proximate cause of the injury;" 

 and the case was decided accordingly.*^ 



So in Illinois where the statute provided that, if the re- 

 quired fences were not erected or were not kept in good re- 

 pair, an action lay for damages by the "agents, engines or 

 cars" of the company, it was held that in an action brought 

 under the statute actual contact must be shown.** But 

 where the statute prohibited the running of trains in towns 

 at a greater rate of speed than the ordinance allowed, and 

 the plaintiff's horses were frightened by a train so run, it was 

 held that no collision need be proved. Such an action was 

 brought, not to recover for "damages done to the person 

 or property by such train, locomotive engine or car," but 

 for a penalty for violation of the statute.*^ 



In Iowa, however, where the company has failed to fence, 

 the injury need not have been caused by collision : if the ani- 

 mal jumps from the track through fright or runs along the 



" Denver & R. G. R. Co. v. Nye, 9 Colo. App. 94. 



" International & G. N. R. Co, v. Hughes, 68 Tex. 290. And see Gulf, 

 C. & S. F. R. Co. V. Ritter, 4 Tex. App. (Civ. Cas.) 212; Tex. & Pac. 

 R. Co. V. Mitchell, Ibid. 454- 



" Tex. & Pac. R. Co. v. McDowell, 7 Tex. Civ. App. 341. 



" Schertz v. Indianapolis, B. & W. R. Co., 107 HI. 577- 



" Chic. & East. 111. R. Co. v. Peo., 120 111. 667. And see 111. Cent. R. 

 Co. V. Crawford, 169 id. 554, where a general distinction is made in this 

 respect between statutes regulating speed and those requiring the erec- 

 tion of fences. 



