RUSSIA, TURKEY, AND BULGARIA. 65 



Empire, with an extension of the Greek frontiers so as to include 

 Epirus and Thessaly. 



On the 31st January, 1876, Count Andrassy, the Prime Minister 

 for Austria, anxious for a pacific solution, submitted to the Great 

 Powers the famous document known by the Andrassy Note, which 

 summarised the wrongs under which the Christian population of 

 Turkey suffered, and which suggested five proposals. 



1. Reforms were essential in the direction of full religious liberty 

 to the Christians. 



2. The system of tax-farming to cease. 



3. The direct taxes raised to be applied to the use of the 

 Provinces. 



4. The establishment of provincial Councils. 



5. To secure the execution of reforms, the re-organization of the 

 police. 



The Andrassy Note was accepted by Russia, Germany, Austria, 

 and Great Britain ; but the weakness of the Andrassy Note was the 

 omission of any real guarantee from the Porte for the carrying out of 

 these reforms, and the result was that the insurgents declared they 

 would not accept such conditions. 



On the nth May, 1876, the Emperor of Russia arrived in Berlin 

 to confer with the Emperors of Germany and Austria in favour of 

 more stringent measures for the pacification of the East than those 

 indicated in the Andrassy Note ; and the result of those Conferences 

 was the issue of the celebrated " Berlin Memorandum^' which was 

 drawn up on the basis of the reforms indicated in the Andrassy Note. 



The declarations of the Beriin Memorandum insisted on a suspen- 

 sion of the insurrection for two months, during which time negotiations 

 should proceed ; and, if the armistice should expire without a pacific 

 result, the Great Powers should come to an agreement with a view 

 to prevent the insurrection from spreading. 



Lord Derby refused to support the Berlin Memorandum because 

 England had not been consulted, and that its demands were un- 

 reasonable ; and this declaration was followed up by the despatch of 

 the English Fleet to Besika Bay, not, as it was alleged, for the 

 purpose of protecting Turkey against external aggression or internal 

 dismemberment, but, in the event of the breaking out of a sanguinary 

 civil war at Constantinople, to protect British subjects and foreigners 

 in general from what was apprehended would be a general massacre. 

 This refusal of England, and demonstration of its Fleet, led practically 

 to the withdrawal of the " Berlin Memorqndum ;" and, despairing of 



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