THE MARITIME CANAL 01" SUEZ. 26 1 



of two continents, this inner sea of the ancient civilisation, she 

 has converted into a channel which reached out to, and, with a 

 new arm, touched the Indian Ocean. 



That this idea of Peace, this grand scheme of civilisation, which 

 was to bring the nations together, to weave them into one, should 

 be changed into an idea of War, — it was impossible ! For it would 

 have driven back into barbarism the civilisation of Europe. 



On the other hand, it must be admitted, that there was no desire 

 on the part of the Government of England to enlarge Empire, by 

 the annexation of Egypt, for they were committed to a policy of 

 Non-annexation, and they disclaimed, over and over again, all 

 idea of conquest, much less of injuring the interests of the Suez 

 Canal Company, or of closing the Canal to the ships of other 

 Nations. 



Whatever, therefore, may have been the blunders committed by 

 England in her Egyptian policy, (and they have been very many), 

 France, on the other hand, committed a greater blunder, when she 

 suddenly withdrew, in 1882, from the English alliance. But great as 

 have been the errors on both sides, this fact remains established as 

 firmly as ever, that the Anglo-French Alliance in the Mediterranean, 

 as elsewhere, is the direct pledge of the World's peace, and, in 

 that alliance, is the best guarantee for the prosperity of the two 

 countries. 



The idea of an Egypt developing all its national resources through 

 the alliance and protection of England and France, is a political 

 conception of the highest rank, which would inevitably have produced 

 a most beneficial effect upon the body politic of Europe. 



In 1877, the two nations endeavoured to give effect to this idea, 

 and the policy, which was described as the Dual Control in Egypt, 

 (whatever opinions we .may entertain upon it), was, nevertheless, a 

 phase of the Anglo-French Alliance, and it was unfortunate that the 

 two Nations were not able to march abreast in the same direction 

 during the crisis of Arabi's revolution, for common action on the 

 part of France and England in that crisis, would have probably led 

 to a more satisfactory result, than that which has been produced by 

 the isolated action of England. . 



If, therefore, the policy of England, by an isolated intervention in 

 Egypt, was a blunder, under the pretence of being European, instead 

 of being Anglo-French, the policy of France, by irresolution at the 



