AN INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR EUROPE. 369 



be the mightiest or the weakest, will be able to obey, without out- 

 raging its amour propre. 



What is required at the present time, is not the decision of an 

 umpire, but the decision of a judge, not the decision of an 

 arbitrator, one chosen by each of the disputant nations, but a 

 decision, given under the executive authority of a Tribunal of 

 Arbitration, deciding, what is the Law of nations, a decision which 

 shall be binding upon both nations who are in dispute, and which 

 shall serve as a precedent for this tribunal, on all questions 

 submitted to them in the future. 



In illustration of this, we might point to the Paris Congress of 

 1856, on the subject of Maritime Law, which met at the close of 

 the Crimean War. At that Congress, forty-six of the civilised 

 powers of the world, assented to a certain line of action to be 

 pursued by maritime nations, in the event of war, which affected 

 both belligerents and neutrals, and the declarations, or decisions of 

 that Congress constitute, undoubtedly, a great reform towards 

 mitigating the horrors, and removing some of the evils of conflict, 

 and, therefore, this reform was a work of humanity and civilisation. 



Yet, although these forty-six Maritime Nations have agreed upon 

 a uniform Code of Maritime Law, in case of War, it can only be 

 treacherous and insecure, whilst it is without an organised judicial 

 tribunal for a correct interpretation, and, if need be, for an en- 

 forcement of its decisions. 



For, in the event of any dispute, or any refusal on the part of any 

 one of these forty-six nations to carry out the Code of Maritime 

 Law agreed upon, the other powers to the Treaty of Paris, have no 

 judicial redress ; each appeals to its law officers, and, guided by their 

 opinion, each nation acts as it thinks best. 



It is, therefore, of the utmost importance, not only to meet such 

 an instance as we have referred to, but many others which must 

 inevitably arise ■ in international relations, to establish a Sovereign 

 authority for a just interpretation of what is International Law, 

 and, should the necessity arise, to proceed against any delinquent 

 nation or state that may refuse, from whatever motive, to abide by 

 its decisions. 



There are, doubtless, many obstacles in the way, and many dangers 

 to be surmounted, in the carrying out of the authority of such a 

 Tribunal for the settlement of national disputes, but there are one 

 or two considerations that warrant the belief that these difficulties 



