APPENDIX. 493 
a foretaste of future plunder, as he would give them every assistance. to 
destroy the whole of the province of Santa Fé when their force would 
arrive. Lopez, intimidated at this threat, and envious of Carrera, made 
a dishonourable peace with his enemy, — selling us, as has been before stated. 
Carrera was accidentally enabled to defend himself from the machinations 
of his insidious enemies, by uniting himself with those very Indians who had 
been called for. his destruction; and necessity obliged him to scourge his 
enemies with the same lash under which they had deliberately doomed him 
to suffer. 
Carrera did in no way encourage the Indians in their attack on Salta: on 
the contrary, he did every thing in his power, and perhaps more than was 
consistent with his safety, to dissuade them from it ; and though he permitted 
a detachment of soldiers to accompany them, it was for the express purpose 
of more effectually deterring them by showing an example of fear, that he 
might thereby prevent the disorders necessarily emanating from the surrender 
of the town. 
Unless by some such stratagem as that. tried by Carrera, the destruction 
of Salta could not possibly have been prevented by us. The Indians are 
naturally jealous and distrustful; and it cannot be supposed that Carrera 
could have such an unbounded ascendancy over their minds in the first days 
of our union with them, as he afterwards acquired by a longer acquaintance 
with them. There was no province that would receive us; and Carrera, by 
restraining them from their project, would have shut the last and only 
avenue which was left us for retreat. If we absolutely refused to allow the 
assault, they would in the same moment mistrust us of being attached to the 
enemy, and as enemies they would proceed against us. Their force was 
upwards of 900, and our squadron about 140. However, Rodriguez in his 
proclamation hinted that we were more barbarous than the Indians them- 
selves, for not having opposed them. If Rodriguez judged of the Indians 
from his knowledge of the Portefios, there is some excuse for him; for our 
140 men were more than sufficient to control and drive 1000 Portetios with. 
out difficulty ; but with that disparity of numbers, against the Indians, we 
could indulge no rational hopes of success. Hence our open and active 
mediation in favour of the town would have been as useless towards its 
safety, as it would have been impolitic, injurious, and destructive, with regard 
to our interests. We had indeed an excellent opportunity of dying in 
defence of our: most implacable enemies, one of whom would not have been 
