INTRODUCTION 5 
a criterion of what we may term effective consciousness. 
There may be sentience which is merely an accompaniment 
of organic action without any guiding influence on subse- 
quent modes of behavior. In that case it is not effective; 
and whether it is present or not we have no means of ascer- 
taining.” 
It may be argued that since learning in us is a conscious 
process that therefore all animals that learn are likewise 
conscious. The inference may be probable, though by no 
means necessary; but it would afford no ground for denying 
consciousness in animals in which learning does not occur. 
If I am pricked by a needle I am acutely conscious. The 
feeling of pain is aroused very directly, and it is difficult to see 
how it can be dependent in any way on associative memory. 
If my memory should fail me to the extent that I would 
straightway forget the experience every time I was pricked 
would not the pricking arouse the same painful sensation 
as before? Would not sound waves produce the sensation 
of hearing and retinal stimulation the sensation of light in 
the absence of any power of recalling similar sensations 
received in the past? Unless it can be shown that there is 
some relation of dependence of consciousness upon associa- 
tive memory in ourselves there is little ground for setting 
up associative memory as a criterion of consciousness in 
animals. The criterion reverses the obvious relation of 
the phenomena. Instead of consciousness being dependent 
upon associative memory, associative memory implies the 
previous existence of consciousness. How can the exist- 
ence of anything be dependent on the association of its 
elements, if these elements can exist only on the condition 
that they are associated? The criterion makes the exist- 
ence of the more simple and general dependent on the exist- 
ence of a special function within its own realm. 
