112 THE DESCENT OF MAN 



It has, 1 think, now been shown that man and the higher 

 animals, especially the Primates, have some few instincts in 

 common. All have the same senses, intuitions, and sensa- 

 tions—similar passions, affections, and emotions, even the 

 more complex ones, such as jealousy, suspicion, emulation, 

 gratitude, and magnanimity; they practice deceit and are 

 revengeful; they are sometimes susceptible to ridicule, and 

 even have a sense of humor; they feel wonder and curiosity; 

 they possess the same faculties of imitation, attention, de- 

 liberation, choice, memory, imagination, the association of 

 ideas, and reason, though in very different degrees. The 

 individuals of the same species graduate in intellect from 

 absolute imbecility to high excellence. They are also liable 

 to insanity, though far less often than in the case of man.'" 

 Nevertheless, many authors have insisted that man is di- 

 vided by an insuperable barrier from all the lower animals 

 in his mental faculties. I formerly made a collection of 

 above a score of such aphorisms, but they are almost worth- 

 less, as their wide difference and number prove the difficulty, 

 if not the impossibility of the attempt. It has been asserted 

 that man alone is capable of progressive improvement; that 

 he alone makes use of tools or fire, domesticates other ani- . 

 mals, or possesses property; that no animal has the power 

 of abstraction, or of forming general concepts, is self- 

 conscious and comprehends itself; that no animal employs 

 language; that man alone has a sense of beauty, is liable to 

 caprice, has the feeling of gratitude, mystery, etc. ; believes 

 in Grod, or is endowed with a conscience. I will hazard a 

 few remarks on the more important and interesting of 

 these points. 



the supposed impassable barrier between the minds of man and the lower 

 animals, says, "The distinctions, indeed, which have been drawn, seem to us 

 to rest upon no better foundation than a great many other metaphysical distinc- 

 tions ; that ia, the assumption tliat because you can give two things different 

 names, they must therefore have different natures. It is difficult to understand 

 how anybody who has ever kept a dog or seen an elephant can have any doubts 

 as to an animal's power of performing the essential processes of reasoning." 



3» See "Madness in Animals," by Dr. W. Lauder Lindsay, in "Journal of 

 Mental Science," July, 1871. 



