334 THE DESCENT OF MAN 



"it ia not too much, to say that the horrible dread of unknown 

 evil hangs like a thick cloud over savage life, and imbitters 

 every pleasure. ' ' These miserable and indirect consequences 

 of our highest faculties may be compared with the incidental 

 and occasional mistakes of the instincts of the lower animals. 



CHAPTEE IV 



COMPARISON OP THE MENTAL POWERS OF MAN AND THE 

 LOWER ANIMALS — Continued 



The moral sense — Fundamental proposition — The qualities of social animals 

 — Origin of sociability — Struggle between opposed instincts — Man a 

 social animal — The more enduring social instincts conquer other less 

 persistent instincts — The social virtues alone regarded by savages — The 

 self -regarding virtues acqijired at a later stage of development — The 

 importance of the judgment of the members of the same community 

 on conduct — Transmission of moral tendencies — Summary 



I FULLY subscribe to the judgment of those writers' who 

 maintain that of all the differences between man and the 

 lower animals, the moral sense or conscience is by far 

 the most important. This sense, as Mackintosh' remarks, 

 "has a rightful supremacy over every other principle of 

 human action"; it is summed up in that short but imperi- 

 ous word ought, so full of high significance. It is the most 

 noble of all the attributes of man, leading him without a 

 moment's hesitation to risk his life for that of a fellow- 

 creature; or after due deliberation, impelled simply by 

 the deep feeling of right or duty, to sacrifice it in some 

 great cause. Immanuel Kant exclaims, "Duty! Wondrous 

 thought, that workest neither by fond insinuation, flattery, 

 nor by any threat, but merely by holding up thy naked law 

 in the soul, and so extorting for thyself always reverence, if 



' See, for instance, on this subject, Quatrefages, "Unit6 de I'EspSce Hii- 

 maine," 1861, p. 21, etc. 



' "Dissertation on Ethical Philosophy," 1837, p. 231, etc 



