THE DESCENT OR ORIGIN OF MAN 136 



not always obedience; before whom all appetites are damb, 

 however secretly they rebel; whence thy original?" • 



This great question has been discussed by many writers* 

 of consummate ability; and my sole excuse for touching on 

 it is the impossibility of here passing it over; and because, 

 as far as I know, no one has approached it exclusively from 

 the side of natural history. The investigation possesses, 

 also, some independent interest, as an attempt to see how 

 far the study of the lower animals throws light on one of 

 the highest psychical faculties of man. 



The following proposition seems to me in a high degree 

 probable — namely, that any animal whatever, endowed with 

 well marked social instincts,* the parental and filial affec- 

 tions being here included, would inevitably acquire a moral 

 sense or conscience, as soon as its intellectual powers had 

 become as well, or nearly as well, developed as in man. 

 For, first, the social instincts lead an animal to take pleas- 

 ure in the society of its fellows, to feel a certain amount of 



« "Metaphysics of Ethics," translated by J. W. Sample, Edinburgh, 1836, 

 p. 136. 



■* Mr. Bain ^ves a list ("Mental and Moral Science," 1868, pp. 543-725) 

 of twenty-six British authors who have written on this subject, and whose 

 names are familiar to every reader ; to these, Mr. Bain's own name, and those 

 of Mr. Lecky, Mr. Shadworth Hodgson, Sir J. Lubbock, and others, might be 

 added. 



' Sir B. Brodie, after observing that man is a social animal ("Psychological 

 Inquiries," 1854, p. 192), asks the pregnant question, "Ought not this to settle 

 the disputed question as to the existence of a moral sense V Similar ideas 

 have probably occurred to many persons, as they did long ago to Marcus Au- 

 relius. Mr. J. S. Mill speaks, in his celebrated work, "Utilitarianism" (1864, 

 pp. 45, 46), of the social feelings as a "powerful natural sentiment," and as 

 "the natural basis of sentiment for utilitarian morality." Again he says, "Like 

 the other acquired capacities aboVe referred to, the moral faculty, if not a part 

 of our nature, is a natural outgrowth from it; capable, like them, in a certain 

 small degree, of springing up spontaneously." But in opposition to all this, he 

 also remarks, "if, as is my own belief, the moral feelings are not innate, but 

 acquired, they are not for that reason less natural." It is with hesitation that 

 I venture to difEer at all from se profound a thinker, but it can hardly be dis- 

 puted that the social feelings are instinctive or innate in the lower animals ; and 

 why should they not be so in man ? Mr. Bain (see, for instance, "The Emo- 

 tions and the WOl," 1865, p. 481) and others believe that the moral sense is 

 acquired by each individual during his lifetime. On the general theory of evo- 

 lution, this is at least extremely improbable. The ignoring of all transmitted 

 mental qualities will, as it seems to me, be hereafter judged as a most serious 

 blemish in the works of Mr. MUL 



