152 THE DESCENT OF MAN 



moral. Moreover, anything performed very often by us will 

 at last be done without deliberation or hesitation, and can 

 then hardly be distinguished from an instinct; yet surely 

 no one will pretend that such an action ceases to be moral. 

 On the contrary, we all feel that an act cannot be considered 

 as perfect, or as performed in the most noble manner, unless 

 it be done impulsively, without deliberation or efEort, in the 

 same manner as by a man in whom the requisite qualities 

 ^e innate. He who is forced to overcome his fear or want 

 of sympathy before he acts, deserves, however, in one way 

 higher credit than the man whose innate disposition leads 

 him to a good act without efEort. As we cannot distinguish 

 between motives, we rank all actions of a certain class as 

 moral, if performed by a moral being. A moral being is 

 one who is capable of comparing his past and future actions 

 or motives, and of approving or disapproving of them. We 

 have no reason to suppose that any of the lower animals 

 have this capacity; therefore, when a Newfoundland dog 

 drags a child out of the water, or a monkey faces danger 

 to rescue its comrade, or takes charge of an orphan monkey, 

 we do not call its conduct moral. But in the case of man, 

 who alone can with certainty be ranked as a moral being, 

 actions of a certain class are called moral, whether per- 

 formed deliberately, after a struggle with opposing motives, 

 or impulsively through instinct, or from the effects of slowly 

 gained habit. 



But to return to our more immediate subject. Although 

 some instincts are more powerful than others, and thus lead 

 to corresponding actions, yet it is untenable that in man the 

 social instincts (including the love of praise and- fear of 

 blame) possess greater strength, or have, through long habit, 

 acquired greater strength than the instincts of self-preserva- 

 tion, hunger, lust, vengeance, etc. Why then does man re- 

 gret, even though trying to banish such regret, that he has 

 followed the one natural impulse rather than the other ; and 

 why does he further feel that he ought to regret his conduct ? 

 Man in this respect differs profoundly from the lower ani- 



