THE DESCENT OB ORIGIN OF MAN 163 



have consulted, with a few exceptions," write as if there 

 must be a distinct motive for every action, and that this 

 must be associated with some pleasure or displeasure. But 

 man seems often to act impulsively, that is from instinct 

 or long habit, without any consciousness of pleasure, in the 

 same manner as does probably a bee or ant, when it blindly 

 follows its instincts, tinder circumstances of extreme peril, 

 as during a fire, when a man endeavors to save a fellow- 

 creature without a moment's hesitation, he can hardly feel 

 pleasure; and still less has he time to reflect on the dissatis- 

 faction which he might subsequently experience if he did 

 not make the attempt. Should he afterward reflect over 

 his own conduct, he would feel that there lies within him 

 an impulsive power widely different from a search after 

 pleasure or happiness; and this seems to be the deeply 

 planted social instinct. 



In the case of the lower animals it seems much more 

 appropriate to speak of their social instincts as having been 

 developed for the general good rather than for the general 

 happiness of the species. The term, general good, may be 

 defined as the rearing of the greatest number of individuals 

 in full vigor and health, with all their faculties perfect, 

 under the conditions to which they are subjected. As the 

 social instincts both of man and the lower animals have no 

 doubt been developed by nearly the same steps, it would 



^ Mill recognizes ("System of Logic," vol. ii. p. 422) in the clearest man- 

 ner, that actions may be performed through habit without the anticipation of 

 pleasure. Mr. H. Sidgwick also, in his Essay on Pleasure and Desire ("The 

 Contemporary Eeview," April, 1872, p. 671), remarks: "To sum up, in contra- 

 vention of the doctrine that our conscious active impulses are always directed 

 toward the production of agreeable sensations in ourselves, I would maintain 

 that we find everywhere in consciousness extra-regarding impulse, directed 

 toward something that is not pleasure ; that in many cases the impulse is so far 

 ^compatible with the self-regarding that the two do not easily coexist in the 

 same moment of consciousness." A dim feeling that our impulses do not by 

 any means always arise from any contemporaneous or anticipated pleasure 

 has, I cannot but think, been one chief cause of the acceptance of the intuitive 

 theory of morality, and of the rejection of the utilitarian or "Greatest happi- 

 ness" theory. With respect to the latter theory, the standard and the motive 

 of conduct have no doubt often been confused, but they are really in some 

 degree blended. 



