THE DESCENT OB ORIGIN OF MAN 169 



animals — so would the standard of his morality rise higher 

 and higher. And it is admitted by moralists of the deriva- 

 tive school, and by some intuitionists, that the standard 

 of morality has risen since an early period in the history 

 of man." 



As a struggle may sometimes be seen going on between 

 the various instincts of the lower animals, it is not surprising 

 that there should be a struggle in 'man between his social 

 instincts, with their derived virtues, and his lower, though 

 momentarily stronger, impulses or desires. This, as Mr. 

 Galton" has remarked, is all the less surprising, as man has 

 emerged from a state of barbarism within a comparatively 

 recent period. After having yielded to some temptation we 

 feel a sense of dissatisfaction, shame, repentance or remorse 

 analogous to the feelings caused by other powerful instincts 

 or desires, when left unsatisfied or balked. We compare 

 the weakened impression of a past temptation with the ever- 

 present social instincts, or with habits gained in early youth 

 and strengthened during our whole lives, until they have 

 become almost as strong as instincts. If with the temptation 

 still before us we do not yield, it is because either the social 

 instinct or some custom is at the moment predominant, or 

 because we have learned that it will appear to us hereafter 

 the stronger, when compared with the weakened impression 

 of the temptation, and we realize that its violation would 

 cause us suffering. Looking to future generations, there is 

 no cause to fear that the social instincts will grow weaker, 

 and we may expect that virtuous habits will grow stronger, 

 becoming perhaps fixed by inheritance. In this case the 

 struggle between^ our higher and lower impulses will be 

 less severe, and virtue will be triumphant. 



^8 A writer in the "North British Eeview" (July, 1869, p. 531), well capable 

 of forming a sound judgment, expresses himself strongly in favor of this con- 

 clusion. Mr. Lecky ("Hist, of Morals," vol. i. p. 143) seems to a certain extent 

 to coincide therein. 



*> See his remarkable work on "Hereditary Genius," 1869, p. 349. The 

 Duke of Argyll ("Primeval Man," 1869, p. 188) has some good remarks on 

 the contest in man's nature between right and wrong. 

 Desceni; — ^Vol. I. — 8 



