170 THE DESCENT OF MAN 



Summary of the last two Chapters. — There can be no 

 doubt that the difierence between the mind of the lowest 

 man and that of the highest animal is immense. An anthro- 

 pomorphous ape, if he could take a dispassionate view of 

 his own case, would admit that, though he could form 

 an artful plan to plunder a garden — though he could use 

 stones for fighting or for breaking open nuts — yet that the 

 thought of fashioning a stone into a tool was quite beyond 

 his scope. Still less, as he would admit, could he follow 

 out a train of metaphysical reasoning, or solve a mathe,- 

 matioal problem, or reflect on Grod, or admire a grand 

 natural scene. Some apes, however, would probably de- 

 clare that they could and did admire thff beauty of the 

 colored skin and fur of their partners .in marriage. They 

 would admit that, though they could make other apes 

 understand by cries some of their perceptions and simpler 

 wants, the notion of expressing definite ideas by definite 

 sounds had never crossed their minds. They might insist 

 that they were ready to aid their fellow-apes of the same 

 troop in many ways, to risk their lives for them, and to 

 take charge of their orphans; but they would be forced 

 to acknowledge that disinterested love for all living crea- 

 tures, the most noble attribute of man, was quite beyond 

 their comprehension. 



Nevertheless the difference in mind between man and 

 the higher animals, great as it is, certainly is one of degree 

 and not of kind. We have seen that the senses and intui- 

 tions, the various emotions and faculties, such as love, 

 memory, attention, curiosity, imitation, reason, etc., of 

 which man boasts, may be found in an incipient, or even 

 sometimes in a well-developed condition, in the lower ani- 

 mals. They are also capable of some inherited improve- 

 ment, as we see in the domestic dog compared with the' 

 wolf or jackal. If it could be proved that certain high 

 mental powers, such as the formation of general concepts, 

 self -consciousness, etc., were absolutely peculiar to man, 

 which seems extremely doubtful, it is not improbable that 



