EXPLANATION OF OBSERVATIONS 203 



the persons experimenting with him,* the first and most 

 important question that arises is this : How was it pos- 

 sible that so many persons (there were about forty) were 



* I cannot enter upon a discussion of the latest psychological prob- 

 lems, here involved, partly because that vfould take us beyond the pur- 

 pose of this monograph, and partly because they are still moot questions 

 and hence not suited to popular treatment. Briefly though, they are 

 these ; What is the nature of the relationship between cognitive and 

 affective states on the one hand and involuntary, (so-called expressive) 

 movements on the other ? Is this connection an external thing, as it 

 were, an association arising as a habit formation, or does every idea 

 partake essentially of a motor character ? Do purely cognitive states 

 give rise to such movements, or does the movement impulse depend 

 more particularly upon the affective consciousness accompanying the 

 cognitive states ? And in how far do given kinds of expressive move- 

 ments depend upon certain ideational types (c.f. page 95) ? Thus, 

 what is the influence of the visual image upon the gestures for " up," 

 " down," etc. .' And then, are these involuntary movements, when not 



noted, truly unconscious, or merely not attended to, in other words, 



are they beyond the pale of consciousness or merely " at the fringe ? " 

 The various writers speak almost without exception of unconscious 

 movements in the strict sense of the term. My own introspections, how- 

 ever, have led me to doubt whether they are quite unconscious. Since 

 I have attained some practice I am able to describe in detail (under 

 conditions of objective control) my involuntary movements, no matter 

 how slight, even down to mere muscular tensions. None of my sub- 

 jects, however, has as yet succeeded in this. It is no very easy matter 

 to be on the lookout for some unknown movements which might even- 

 tually occur, while attempting to concentrate attention to the utmost 

 upon a certain definite ideational content, for this very dividing of 

 attention effects a decrease in the force of the movement, and thus 

 makes it all the more difiicult to discover. From my own experience, 

 however, I am inclined to believe that these movements are not uncon- 

 scious, but merely unattended to, in other words, we have a narrowing 

 down of the apperceived content within certain limits, but not a narrow- 

 ing down of consciousness, (much less a " splitting " of consciousness 

 or of personality as the thing unfortunately has sometimes been called). 

 In order, however, not to be guilty of premature judgment, I have 

 avoided the terms " unconscious " and " unattended to," and chose ex- 

 pressions which leave these finer distinctions untouched. 



