CONCLUSION 



243 



Though our investigations do not give support to the 

 fantastic acounts of animal intelligence given by Brehms, 

 they by no means warrant a return to Descartes and his 

 theory of the animal-machine (as is advocated by a num- 

 ber of over-critical investigators). We cannot deny the 

 validity of conclusions from analogy without denying at 

 the same time the possibility of an animal psychology — 

 indeed of all psychology. And all such conclusions indi- 

 cate that the lower forms possess the power of sense- 

 perception, that they, like us, presumably have at their 

 disposal certain images, and that their psychic life is to a 

 large extent also constituted of mere image-associations, 

 and that they too, learn by experience. Also that they 

 are susceptible to feelings of pleasure and of pain and 

 also to emotions, as jealousy, fear, etc., though these 

 may be only of the kind which have a direct relation to 

 their life-needs. We are in no position to deny a priori 

 the possibility of traces of conceptual thought in those 

 forms nearest man in the scale — whether living in their 

 natural manner or under artificial conditions. And even 

 less so since the final word has not yet been spoken re- 

 garding the nature of conceptual thinking itself. All that 

 is certain is that nothing of the kind has been proven to 

 occur in the lower forms, and that as yet not even a 

 suitable method of discovering its existence has been 

 suggested. But the community of those elementary 

 processes of mental life which we have mentioned above 

 is in itself enough to connect the life of the lower forms 

 with ours, and imposes upon us the duty of regarding 

 them not as objects for exploitation and mistreatment, 

 but as worthy of rational care and affection. 



